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CHAPTER II.
HOW CHURCIE PROPERTY MAY BE ACQUIRED AND TITLES HELD.
THE restraints imposed upon the transfer of property for re-
ligious purposes by the Statutes of Mortr'ain and Wills and
otherwise, and the question of corporate capacity to receive or
hold atles, have already been briefly considered.
The inquiry now to be made relates to the several modes in which
the right to property may be acquired for church purposes in the
absence of restraining provisions, and where the purpose of acqui-
sition is not prohibited by or in excess of the amount permitted
by statutory law. By the common law in England and under the
established church system, there were restraints on the acquisition
of property for" superstitious uses." 7 But under our government,
7 See note 52 ante. At the October Term 1871 of the Common Pleas of Gal-
lia county, Ohio, an interesting case (Rothgeb, Executor, v. Rotihgsb's. Derisees)
was decided by Judge W. W. JoHNsox, involving the validity of a trust to'pro-
pagate Atheism. Rothgeb by his will directed a monument to be erected, not r
mark his resting-place, but in a conspicuouas place, with an inscription containing
i brief irgument to prove that "death is the eternal dissolution of the soul and
body; * * the soul as the flame of a lamp blown out is no more." The executor filed
a petition asking the court to determine his duty. JoHNson, J., held that an in-
dividual had a right "to express the sentiments of the proposed inscription, or to
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with its religious freedom, the same restraints do not exist. In
considering the mode in which property may be acquired for
church purposes, the first inquiry should always be as to the ca-
pacity to take and the restraints thereon, if any, imposed by local
found a school or publish books promulgating the same principles." But he held
these rights of freedom of action, of speech and the press "'are ncrsonal rights * *
which die with him and are not capable of being aliened or delegated 
"  and that
the courts will not lend their aid to affirmative acts subversive of religion, although
they would not use their coercive power in support of it," and so decreed anuainst
executing this provision of the will. The court cited Ordinance 1787, art. 3-5
provisions of the Ohio Constitution, 2 Ohio St. 387 ; 4 Id. 586. See Webter's
argument in the great Girard Vill Case. This case is now in tle Supreme Court
of Ohio. The report of the ease will necessarily set out the w-,rd, the testator
directed to be inscribed on a monument. This will more effectually propagate
his doctrines than any monument the executor could erect-" acre p)(rennifll.'
See Board ofEducation v. Minor et a., 23 Ohio St. 211, and the elaborate ar-
guments on and decision by Superior Courrof Cincinnati in same case, entitled
"The Bible in the Public Schools," Cincinnati, Ohio, 1871. As to Franklin's
motion for prayers in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, see 5 Elliott's De-
bates 254. -Franklin himself wrote concerning the matter: " The convention,
with three or four exceptions, thought prayers unnecesqary."-Spark.'s Life nn'l
Writings of Franklin, vol. v., p. 153. And Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. Sparks,
April 8th 1831, refers to the 1' account so erroneously given, with every semblance
of authenticity," concerning the proposition for a religious service in the conven-
tion, and which account appeared in the National Intelligeneer a few years before,
purporting to have been derived from " tile youngest member of the convention."
B. F. Morris, in his " Christian Life and Character of the Civil Inqtitutions of the
United States," is mistaken in saying prayers were had. lie refers to a work
published in 1825, " Religious Opinions and Character of Washington."
As to date of Constitution, see I Elliott's Debates 317; 5 Id. 555.
See note 5 ante.
As to religious freedom : Potter's Dwarris on Statutes 554-565.
For lands granted by Congress for religious purposes, see Am. St. Papers, Pub.
Lands, vol. 6, pp. 448, 477, 663, and vol. 5, p. 391 ; Act of Congress, July 23d
1787 ; Act April 2d 1792 ; note 6 ante.
Where the object of a trust is illegal it will not be executed by the courts : Tif-
fa 'v & Bullart on Tru'ts 247-249 ; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43 ; Andrew v.
-V. Y. B. 4- P. B. Soct., 4 Sanf. S. C. R. 184 ; Willard Eq. .578 ; 11est v. Shut-
tlewvorth, 2 M. & K. 684, 698; De Thendes v. De Bonneral, 5 Russ. 288. But
if in such ease a trust shows a design to promote charity generalil, there will be a
cy pres application ; Att.-Gen. v. Green, 2 Bro. C. C. 492 ; Da ('"oa v. Da Paz,
Ambl. 228; Att.-Gen. v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 848 ; Att.-Gen. v. Gr,ise. 2 Id. 266;
Martin v. 11arghain, 14 Simons 230.
As to what is a general charitable intent, see cases collected in lill on Trustees
452; Tiffany & Bullard on Trustees 247.
In England the application is made by the crown ; in this country it may he
Alone by the legislature : Willard's Eq. 580; Aqers Y. if. E. Ch...: Snn'hf. S. C.
R1. 351 ; Andrews v. N. Y. B. 4" P. B. Sot., 4 Id. 178 ; Tiffany & hilard 249.
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regulations or general provisions or principles. Many of the
principles applicable to the acquisition of realty are equally so as
applied to persorialty. But first of all it is deemed proper to in-
quire as to realty.
Sir EDWARD COKE defined a title-Titdlus est justa causa pos-
sidendi id quod nostrum est-or as BLACKSTONE says, - the means
whereby the owner of lands bath the just possession of his pro-
perty." The books on the law of real estate say that there are
two methods of acquiring an estate in things real, to wit:-
1. DESCENT, in which title isyested by operation of law, and
2. PURcHAsE, in which title is vested in a party by his own act
or agreement.
The word "purchase" has a technical legal import, iiore com-
prehensive than in popular use, including every mode of acquiring
title other than by descent.
TITLE BY DESCENT.
A corporation is endowed with succession, and in religious cor-
porations this is generally declared by the organic act perpetual.
The individual members of a corporation may, from time to time,
change until none may survive of those living when a title to realty
has been acquired, but the ideal or corporate person continues and
holds for the benefit of living members or on trusts defined. This
continuous title is not descent, it is corporate succession or perpe-
tuity.
There are but few cases where titles may be transmitted by
descent for religious purposes, and yet there are some.
Where property is held in common for combined religious and
tenporal purposes, under a religious system which devotes it to
the use of a community, it descends to the adhering members for
their common objects, to the exclusion of all who withdraw, as in
the case of the "Separatists," the so-called "Shakers" and other
communists.
78 •
If a gift for charity be made for an illegal object, with no purpose for general
charity, the charity will fail, and a resulting trust for the heir or next of kin will
arise: lJrest v. S uttleworth, 2 M. & K. 684, 658 ; De Theines v. De Bonneral,
5 Russ. 288 ; Tiffany & Bullard Trusts 249. So there may-be a resulting trust
in that class of cases where in England the sign manual of the king was neces-.
sary to adminiZter a trust unless the legislature give it effect - Willard's Eq. 596;
4 Kent Com. 508 ; Tiffany & Bullard Trusts 248.
78 See note 47, and cases there cited, and .Beatty v. Kurtz, 2 Peters 566 ; Ki-
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So property devised or conveyed to certain persons and their
heirs in trust for specified religious purposes without designating a
trustee as successor, will upon the death of the original devisee or
grantee descend to their heirs, charged with the trust, and the title
will remain in the heirs until the proper court shall appoint a trus-
tee, and decree a conveyance, or until he shall voluntarily convey
to a trustee. This is so upon general equity principles.7 9 In
some of the states, and, as has been shown, in the District of Colum-
bia, there are statutes which specifically provide a mode of supply-
ing a succession of trustees by appointment of churches, in which
case the title at once vests in the trustees so appointed."
TITLE BY PURCHASE.
In England there are perhaps some modes of acquiring titles to
realty unknown in practice in this country. There and here are also
modes of acquiring titles that can have no application in practice
to those to or for religious societies. The modes in use here in the
ascending order of their importance are by:
1. PRESUMPTION of a grant;
2. PRESCRIPTION;
8. LICENSE;
4. DEDICATION ; and by
5. ALIENATION, including deed of conveyance, devise and pos-
sibly other modes of conveyance by act of the parties.
These are all modes of acquiring the legal title to realty, or of
whatever title could pass from the original owner, and of course
there are modes of acquiring only equitable titles, by contract,
&c., familiar to jurists and lawyers.
The acquisition of title by estopel is not enumerated as a dis-
sor's Appeal, 62 Penna. St. 428; Schnorr's Appeal, 67 Id. 138. The so-called
Shakers, hear Lebanon, Ohio, have a written bondl of union controlling their
property, a copy of which the writer has, but which has never been published.
79 See note 48 ante.
s0 See note 49 ante. It has already been stated that the Moravian Church took
title to a person who was required to make a will to transmit title for church pur-
poses. So a practice has prevailed in the Roman Catholic Church of having title
vested in the archbishop, who transmits it to his successor by will. In Tayler's
Precedents of Wills 243, a form is given as follows : " This is the last will and
testament of me, I. R., of, &c. I devise all my real estates vested in me as * *
trustee, unto L. L. and M. M., of, &c., and their heirs, upon suchf trusts and sub-
ject to such equities as shall at my decease be subsisting concerning the same re-
spectively."
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tinctive mode of effecting a conveyance at law or in equity, because
it operates rather on the evidence than on the real title, which iN
left to pass in theory and effect in one of the modes already indi-
cated."'
These five several modes of acquiring title are separate and dis-
tinct, though as to some of them, "thin partitions do their bounds
divide." The elementary treatises and court reports contain elab-
orate definitions and discussions of these subjects, of the distinc-
tions between them, the cases in which these modes of acquiring
title are operative, the principles which govern them, and the rules
of evidence which guide in applying them. Much of this learning
has no application to titles held for church purposes, and of that
which has, only a brief summary can now be presented. The value
of this is by no means limited to operate as a guide in acquiring
titles, but it reaches back to principles on which existing titles rest,
and for the protection of which the sources of information must be
explored.
I. PRESUMPTION OF A GRANT.
It may be stated in general terms that courts of law and of
equity in support of an adverse, continuous, actual occupancy of
realty under claim of title bond fide in law and fact for a period
of time equal to the local statute of limitations, PRESUME A GRANT
to the occupant from all adverse claimants, in all those cases not
covered by such statute."" There are cases where an occupancy
si In 3 Washburn's Law of Real Property 70 [459], it is said, " It is not,
however, that an estoppel gives an estate, or divests another of an estate or interest
in lands. It merely binds the interest by a conclusion which precludes the par-
ties between whom it is made to operate, from asserting or denying the state of
tie title." I Prest. Abst. 420 ; 2 Id. 205; Crabbe Real Prop. 1046 ; 2 Smith's
Lead. Cas., 5th Am. ed. 642. Washburn cites cases of estoppel: Ham v. Ham,
14 Me. 351 ; Hicks v. Cram, 17 Verm. 449; Barker v. Bell, 37 Alab. 359 ; lic-
Pherson v. Malters, 16 Id. 714 ; Att.-Gen. v. Mferrimack Co., 14 Gray 586-604;
Cia. v. Wh7ite, 6 Pet. 438; Hobbs v. Lowell, 19 Pick. 405-409 ; Hunter v. Trustees,
6 Ilill 41 ; State v. Trask, 6 Verm. 355 ; 19 Ohio St. 514; Perry on Trusts,
870 ; Buckingham v. Snith, 10 Ohio 292.
s2 As to Easements. Waahburn's Easements and Servitudes 24 [19], 25 [20],
101 [66], 103 [6S], 105 [70], 107 [71]. This doctrine originally only applied
to easementst. Ferris v. Brown, 3 Barb. 105 ; 2 Washb. Real Prop. 293 [39] ; 3
Id. 51 [448]. But now it extends to lands: Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59,
and Cruise has devoted a chapter to titles to land acquired by prescription.
For prescription or usucalion (usu rem capere) by the civil law, see Maine
Ane. L. 284 ; Wood Civ. L. 123 ; Phillips Jurisprudence, 147 ; Washb. Ease-
ments 62.
As to Lands. Starkie Evidence, part iv., p. 1222, tit. "Prescription ;" Be-
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will be protected in much less tine than the period fixed by the
Statute of Limitations, but these are suigeneris. * They are cases
where the evidence shows it probable that a graiit has in fact been
made, or where from some equity it ouqitt to have been niade. "8
This is indeed a branch of the same law. This benign doctrine
,has been carried so far as to presume a grant from the govrntnent,
even in opposition to the maxim, Nullun tempus oecurrit Je'qi,
and against the truth8s The presumption rests on the principle
die v. Beard, 12 Co. 5 ; Eldridge v. Knott, Cowp. 215; Id. 109, 110; 1 Greenl1.
Ev., 45 n. ; 2 Id., 541 n. ; Jarboe v. ilciAtee, 7 B. Monroe 279 ; .Jackson v.
.Mfcall, 10 Johns. 377 ; Ricard v. Willianzi, 7 Wheat. 59 [244] ; ourcier v. Gra-
ham, 1 Ohio 349 ; Roads v. Symmes, Id. 316 ; 5 Id. 456 ; Berthelenmj v. .Ahnson.
3 B. Monroe 92; Schauber v. Jackson, 2 Wend. 13; Jackson v. Schooranker, 7
Johns. 12 ; V-andyck v. Van Beuren, 1 Caines R. 84; Farrar v. M1errill, I Greeinl.
17 ; Grote v. Grote, 10 Johns. 492 ; Burgen v. Bennett, I Cables C. I ; Archer v.
Tanner, 2 Hen. & Man. 370.
As to Churches. See notes 55 ante, 90 post. IIoffman's Eec. L. 123-126: lar-
pending v. Dutch Church, 16 Pet. 455 l Humbert v. Trinity Church, 22 Wend 4 5;
Dutch Church v. 11ott, 7 Paige 77 ; People v. Trinity Church, N. Y. Court of Ap-
peals, Sept. 1860 ; 1ather v. Trinity Church, 3 S, & R. 509 ; Att.-Gcn. ex rel.
Aarsellus, v. 3inister, 6-c., N. Y. Court of Appeals 1867 ; Wlliams v. Presyte-
rian Church, 1 Ohio St. 478.
See Baker v. Fales. 16 -Mass. 488 ; Doe Y. Trustees, 2 Hawks 233 ; 'enyj V.
Philadelphia, 4 Harr. 79.
The possission must be " bondfide in law." As an example: a possession hy a
purchaser cannot be in law adverse to his vendor by contract before payment un-
less continued long beyond the period of statutory limitation: Washb. E'asements
105 [70] ; Perry on Trusts, 866. So the possession of a trustee generally is not in
law adverse to his cestui que trust, whatever the fact may be. So in case of mutual
mistake: Campbell v. lVilson, 3 East 294. In Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 244,
SToRY, J., says, "It is the policy of courts of law to limit the presumption of
grants to periods analogous to those of the Statute of'Limitations in cases where the
statute does not apply. But where the statute applies it constitutes ordinarily a suf-
ficient title or defence, independently of any presumption of a grant, and there-
fore it is not generally resorted to. But if the circumstances of the case justify it,
a presumption of a grant may as well be made in the one case as in the other."
63 Foley v. Wilson, I1 East 56 ; Phillips Ev., lh. vii., s. 2, p. 126 ; Ricard v.
Williams, 7 Wheat. 244 ; Perry on Trusts, 866, and cases cited ; Bealy v. Show,
6 East 215 ; Courcier v. Graham, I Ohio 440; Duke v. Thompson, 16 Id. 53
3finns v. M"forse, 15 Id. 571 ; Perry on Trusts, 869, and cases cited.
84 Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co. 5, cited Stark. Ev., part iv., p. 1222, commented on
Cowp. 109, 110 ; Eldridqe v. Knott, Id. 215 ; ,Tarboe v. McAtee, 7 B. Monroe
279 ; Jackson Y. 31cCall, 10 Johns. 377 ; Croker v. Pendleton, 10 Shepley 339 ;
Mfayor of Hull v. Horner, Cowp. 102 ; Powell v. M1illbank, 12 G. 3, B. I. I T.
R. 399; Goodtitle v. Baldwin, I1 East 488; Rex v. Brown, cited Cowp. Io;
Mather v. Trinity Church, 3 S. & 1. 509 ; Poe v. Ireland, 11 East 280; Read v.
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(1) " which will not presume any man's act to be illegal ;" (2) upon
the docrhie that '" those who are silent when they should speak shall
be silent when they would speak," (3) "on a consideration of the
hardship which would accrue to parties if after long possession
Brookenm, 3 Term It. 159 ; Rex v. Carpenter, 2 Show. 48 ; Biddulph v. Ather, 2
Wils. 23; Bullardv. .larksdale, 11 Ired. 461.
These eases show that the courts have presumed, contrary to tie real fact, a
grant from the king in favor of an occupancy, so as to defeat a later actual g,,:,t
from the king, though in such cases, as said in Jarboe v. 31cAtee, "a longcil co..
tinned peaceable enjoyment has generally been deemed necessary * * than is dceni, "
sufficient to authorize the like presumption in the case of deeds from private per-
sons." These principles as applied to government grants are of the utuio-t ins-
portance, and are absolutely essential to the repose of society. The Statut& of
Limitations does not run against the government, nor in favor of the occupant of
land, until the patent issues : Roads v. Symins, I Ohio 316 ; Duke v. Thomupson,
16 Id. 34. A person who had complied with the pre-emption laws of Congress,
and so entitled to a patent, might neglect to procure its issue, his estate travel
down through generations, and when the evidence of his claim is lost a third per-
son might enter the lanl, procure patent and oust him but for this salutary doctrine.
So a person might enter hind, receive his certificate of entry, and'having paid in
full, but neglected to procure patent, might'need the same principle for his pro-
tection. So in the Virginia Military District in Ohio, in the Kentucky Military
)itrict, and in others, entries on warrants never carried into patent might be lost
without remedy but for this principle. Imperfect entries need the application of
the rule. This should certainly be so where a party came into possession under
"color of title," as in Bedle v. Beard, 12 Co. 5. In the Virginia Military Dis-
trict the prior entry appropriates the land even as against a junior entry carried
into patent. But in Ridley v. Heitman, 10 Ohio 524, a court of equity refused to
decree the legal title in favor of the prior entry where the junior entry carried into
latent had been held for a period equal to the Statute of Limitations, though the,
.tatute did not bind the chancery court. This was evidently on the doctrine of
'-stale equity," or it should be more properly on a presumed grant from the party
holding the original entry. Since the case of Ridley v. Hettman, tie Act of Con-
gress of March 2d 1807 declares void all patents issued on lands on which there
was a prior survey. The holder of a prior survey could therefore procure a pat-
cut ani would no longer seek his remedy in equity, but would do so at law. But
if lie delayed to procure his patent until the period had run out for presuming a
grant from hint in favor of the holder of a junior survey carried into patent with
twenty-one years' possession tinder it, lie would be without remedy. Ilis equity
under his survey would pass by presumption to the occupant under the junior sir-
vey: Duke v. 7wtompson, 16 Ohio 48 ; Blake v. Davis, 20 Id. 242 ; Ricard v. Wi'-
luis, 7 Wheat. 244. This must be so or a large class of cases will be without
remedy. See note 89 ante, as to notice and tax sales.
The only effect of the Act of 1807 was to change the remedy from equity to
ejectment at law. What was before illegal in equity became illegal at law. Yet
if equity would not, prior to the statute, aid a party after twenty-one years to re-
cover onl his prior survey against an occupant under a junior survey, it must since
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and when time had robbed them of the means of proof, their titles
were to be subjected to rigorous examination;" and (4) "upon a
principle of public policy and convenience which operates to the
preservation of the public peace and the quieting of men's posses-
sions ;" and (5) "becaus it can work no prejudice except to those
who are guilty of negligence in their affairs."85
The presumption will be made often in well known opposition
to the fact." And unle s the salutary principle on which it rests
is to be nullified or igno ed, the presumption must be held as one
of law, not merely offact, and so it cannot be repelled or rebutted
but is conclusive.r The history of the doctrine proves this. It
the statute enjoin an ejectment i, or rights will be sacrificed to mere modes of seek-
ing redress.
In Angell on Limitations, 1 38, it is said, "WhIt might be the operation of
the statute on private persons in cases where the legal estate remains in the state,
with an equitable interest in those persons, was considered by the late Ch. Justice
TI LoMAN of Pennsylvania a point involving important consequences, and would
require great consideration when it shall call for a decision :" Johnson v. Irwin,
3 S. & R. 291 ; Thomas v. tcz&ch, 3 Sumn. 170 ; Willimns v. Presb. Soc., 1 Ohio
St. 492. Washburn on Easements 102 [66], referring to titles between individu-
als, says the presumption may arise "though the jury should not find as a fact
'that any deed had ever been Imade ; and although the user began in fact as an
act of trespass."
ss Stark. Ev., part iv., p. 1202; Eldrid.qe v. Knott, Cowp. 215 ; 1 Mod. 117;
I Lev. 25; Palm. 427 ; Knigt v. Halsey, 2 B. & P. 206; Ex diuturnitate tern-
poris omnia prmurmuntur solemniter esse acta, Co. Litt. 6. Lord CoxE says, "that
an Act of Parliament may be presumed, even in the case of the crown, which is
not bound by the statutes of limitation :" Broom's Legal Max. 852 ; Id. 800;
Angell on Lim., passim; Pendleton v. Galloway, 9 Ohio 180; Ridley v. Ilettman,
10 Id. 524; Ricard v. 1lha1*s, 7 Wheat. 244 ; BtIckingham v. Smith, 10 Ohio
298 ; 5 Ohio St. 318.; 11 Id. Perry on Trusts, 869, and cases cited.
86 See cases note 84 ante. STORgY, J., in Ricard v. Williams, 7 Wheat. 59
[244], said the presumptions "can never fairly arise where all the circumstances
are perfectly consistent with the non-existence of a giant. Afortiori, they cannot
arise where the claim is of such a nature as is at variance with the supposition of
a grant." But this is contrary to the reason and object of the presumption, and
is flatly in opposition to the prevailing rule now.
Washburn, in his Easement 103 [68], says, "The fiction of presuming a grant
from twenty years' possession or use was invented by the English courts in the
18th century, to avoid the absurdities of their rule of legal memory, and was de-
rived by analogy from the lirmitation prescribed by the stat. 21 Jac. 1, c. 21, for
actions of ejectment, not upon a belief that a grant in any particular case has been
made, but on general presumptions." Id. 101 [66]. Edson v. Munsell, 10 Allen
568 ; Valentine v. Piper, 22 Pick. 93; Jfelrin v. Lock, 17 Id. 255 ; Emaus v.
Turnbull, 2 Johns. 313 ; Tudo5 Lead. Cas. 114 ; Coolidge v. Learned, 8 Pick. 504.
57 This necessarily follows from the authorities in the preceding notes. The
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is said that "the Court of Chancery was the first to adopt this
doctrine of presuming the existence and loss of a deed in 170T ;
but that it was not till 1761 that the courts of common law
adopted it."' I It was introduced to protect the possession of ease-
ments and. servitudes-incorporeal hereditaments-as a matter of
necessity, because the Statute of Limitations did not apply to these,
but only to corporeal hereditaments. But now the presumption
applies in law and in equity courts, and protects equally legal and
equitable titles or even title acquired by trespass.
As the doctrine commenced with a .design of supplying a defect
in the Statute of Limitations, it must apply to all cases where in
any party an equitable title exists, either by an inchoate title from
the government or other equity, which may be lost or transferred
by presumption, or it will only accomplish a part of its purpose.
It is not necessary that the possession which is protected shall
have been with the knowledge of the person whose title is trans-
ferred by the presumption, for any such qualification would prac-
tically defeat the whole purpose, reason and scope of the doctrine
itself. The reason of the law is the life of the law, so much so
that when the reason of a rule ceases the rule itself ceases. And
question has been much controverted but should now be regarded as at rest : Strick-
ler v. Todd, 10 S. & R. 63-69 ; Bust v. Low, 6 Mass. 90; Mayor v. Homer,
Cowp. 102; 2 Greenl. Ev., 539; Washburn's Easements 105 [70]; Olney V.
Fenner. 2 R. 1. 211 ; Pillsbury v. foore, 44 Me. 154; JBelknap v. Trimble, 3 Paige
577; Townshend v. McDonald, 2 Kern. 381 ; fHazard v. Robinson, 3 Mason 272;
IVilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev. 154 ; Ingraham v. Hough, I Jones N. C. 39 ; Gayelty
v. Bethune, 14 Mass. 51, 53 ; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309, 315 ; Corning. v.
Goubl, 16 Id. 531 ; Hadl v. McLeod, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 98 ; Wallace v. Fletcher, 10
Fo-tcr 434; ||innipiseoqee Co. v. Young, 40 N. I. 420 ; Tracy v. Atherton, 36
Verm. 512, reviews Townsendv. Downer, 32 Id. 183 ; Knight V. jhalsey 3 Bos.
& P. 172, 206; Curtis v. Keesler, 14 Bari. 511 ; 1 Greenl. Ev., 17-45, and cases
cited; 3 Cruise Dig. 467-8; Tyler v. |Wilkinson, 4 Mason 402 ; Ingraham v. Hut-
chinson, 2 Conn. 584 ; Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East 215; J1right v. Howard, 1 Sim. &
Stu. 203 ; Strickler v. Todd, 10 S. & R. 69 ; .lston v. Benstead, I Campb. 465 ;
Danidl v. North. 11 East 371 ; Sherwood v. Burr, 4 Day 244 ; Tinkburn v. Arnold,
3 Greenl. 120 ; H1ill v. Crosby, 2 Pick. 466 ; Best on Presumptions 103, note in;
B3oliar Min. Co. v. N eponset H!. Co., 16 Pick. 241.
69 Washburn's Easements 109 [72] ; lVallace v. Fletcher, 10 Foster 446. Like
all new and valuable doctrines, it has been strongly resisted; 3 Dane Abr. 55 :
2 wasbb. Real Prop. 294 [40], and eases cited. But Washburn's Easements 109
[72], says, it "must now be considered as established law." In Parker v. Foote,
19 Wend. 309: the court say, "the modern doctrine of presuming a right by
grant * exerts a much wider influence in quieting possession than the old doc-
trine of title by prescription."
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any qualification of a rule which annihilates the rule itself cannot
be sound."5
89 In WVilson v. Wilson, 4 Dev. 154, tle court say, " If the presumption was
not repelled they (the jury) ought to find for the defendants" claiming tie pre-
sumption : citing 2 Stark. Ex. 669, part iv., pp. 1202-1222 ; Ingraham v. llougl ,
I Jones N. C. 39. Even this, as has been shown in previous notes, is not carry-
ing tie doctrine so far as law and reason extend it: 1 Greenl. Ev., 17-45 ; 3
Cruise Dig. 467 ; Co. Lit. 113 a. There are some authorities applicable to case-
ments only that the presumption cannot arise in favor of a possession unless it is
with the knowledge of the person seised of the inheritance: Washb. Easements
103 [67], 105 [70]; Cooper v. Smith, 9 S. & R. 26 ; 2 Greenl. Ev., 539, n. 1.
There may be some reason for this as applied to them since the person scised of
the inheritance cannot always know that an easement is being enjoyed. No such
qualification as to the land itself is found in the cases cited in previous notes, nor
in Washburn 106 [70], when stating the rule, nor 2 Stark. Ev., part iv., p. 1201
note b, nor in Ridley v. Hettman, 10 Ohio 524, nor in Tudor's Lead. Cas. 114, nor
by any authority which can comprehend the reason and spirit and object of the
principle. This possibly may do as to easements in a case where the possession
which claims protection is only constructive, or is not evidenced by such notorious
acts as would lead the person seised of the inheritance to assert his rights. But a
notorious possession must be deemed evidence of such knowledge, as that the per-
son seised of the inheritance could not assert he was not put upon inquiry. l'os.
session has always been deemed notice of tile claim of the party in possession, from
which it is conclusively presumed the person seised of the inheritance had know-
ledge, and any attempt to engraft exceptions on this is monstrous, as to the own-
ership of land : House v. Beatty, 7 Ohio It., part 2, p. 84-90 ; Kelly v. Stan-
berry, 13 Ohio 408-426 ; 3 Washb. Real Prop. 284 [591] ; Lea v. Polk, 21 lIow.
493; Tatkins v. Edwards, 23 Texas 443; Partridge v. McKinney, 10 Cal. 181 ;
Stafford v. Lick, 7 Id. 479 ; Hunter v. Matson, 12 Id. 363; Morrison v. Kelly, 22
Ills. 610; flIelms v. May, 29 Ga. 121 ; Iyatt v. Elam, 23 Id. 201 ; Berg v. Shep-
leg, I Grant Cas. 429 ; Coleman v. Barklew, 3 Dutch. 357 ; McKinzie v. Perrell,
15 Ohio St. 168 ; Williams v. Presb. Soc., 1 Id. 492 ; Buckin ham v. Smith, 10 Ohio
282.
A party who neglects his land and refuses to pay taxes is in no good position to
say he had no knowledge that others were occupying it. Ile is bound to know
that the states enforce tax collections by land sales, and as against a tax title lie
could make no such claim. And where a party is in possession under color of
title and with a chain of title on record, the Registry Acts generally make such
recorded deeds notice. But possession without this will raise the presumption of
a grant for land. It has been well observed "that ancient possession would injure
instead of strengthening a title if after a succession of ages and the decease of tile
parties objections should prevail which might have been answered in the lifetime
of the parties, and which if well founded would have been sooner made :" Bedle
v. Beard, 12 Co. 5 ; Cowp. 109-215 ; Perry on Trusts, 869. This applies as
well where tie person seised of the inheritance does not know of the possession as
where he does.
There is another conclusive reason against requiring proof that the person seised
of the inherit.ince ki.ew o.' tl e adverse po-Sciomn. 'I ie I,, ks agree that the
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This docrine will exert a wide and salutary influence in giving
repose to church titles.
But it goes b6yond the mere question of title, and has an ap-
plication affecting the purposes for which property may be held.
It sometimes becomes desirable to sell church property, which
by a conveyance in trust has been devoted to the purposes of a
particular religious denomination. The power conferred on courts
by genjeral equity principles, or by statute, is often in such cases
overlooked or disregarded, and a sale made by those holding the
legal title without any formal ratification by the eestui que trusts,
and perhaps in some instances against the wishes of some or all of
them. Where property has been so donated upon a use as the
consideration, it may nevertheless be sold to trustees for another
religious denomination or generally, with the assent of the donor
and eestui que trusts, or without the consent of the donor, when
the title has been derived upon a pecuniary consideration. But
these precautions are often not taken. When a sale and convey-
ance has been made without these, the title of the purchasers will
often be quieted even in a less period than is fixed by the Statute
of Limitations on proof of the acquiescence of the parties having
a right originally to prevent a transfer.90
principle of presumption of a grant was adopted by way of analogy to the Statute
of Limitations.
The Statute of Limitations requires no such knowledge. The analogy there-
fore fails if any such qualification is made in the rule. The equity courts are not
bound by the statute, and yet they act on it by way of analogy without any such
qualification: Pendleton v. Galloway, 9 Ohio 180.
90 In addition to the cases cited in notes in this chapter, see notes 47, 53, 15,
74'; Hoffman's co. L. 217; Id. chap. xxiii. ; Robinson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 64;
People v. Steele, 2 Id. 397; High on Injunctions, chap. v. ; Perry on Trusts,
? . 61, 864; Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488; Doe v. Trustees, 2 Hawks 233; Penny
v. Philadelphia, 4 Harr. 79 ; Perry on Trusts, 870: Williams v. First Presb.
Soc., 1 Ohio St. 478.
The principle of estoppel would often apply where the cestui que trusts stood by
and saw a purchase made, or knew of it and made no objection, under circum-
stances which required their protest, or saw improvements made on the faith of the
purchase.
Lands were granted by Congress to Ohio, in trust for common schools: I Chase
Stat. 71-74: Swans. Land L., passim. On 26th Febrtary 1824, the iegislature
memorialized Congress for its consent that the state might sell the lands : IV. Am.
St. Papers, Pub. Lands 47. So Missouri : Dec. I Ith 1828, vol. 5, p. 603. Con-
gress by Act of Feb. 15th 1843 (1 Lester Land Laws 82), Act of May 19th 1852
(Id. 181), Act February 19th 1851 (Id. 173), authorized some of the states to sell
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The courts would doubtless, for the sake of repose, extend the
same principles to parties in possession, in case of a divided con-
gregation, especially on sufficient evidence of acquiescence.
And the perversion of a trust would in proper cases receive the
same consideration, especially in cases which might invoke the
power of a court to make a cy pres application of trust principles.
These principles will apply to each of the seven forms or agen-
cies asserting title through which a religious society may seek its
organized purposes, to wit: (1) an unincorporated association, (2) by
unincorporated trustees claiming for such society, (3) by corporation
or trustees quasi corporate for such associations, by (4) an incorpo-
rated society, (5) common law trustees for such corporation, (6) by
corporation or trustees quasi corporate for such corporation or by
(7) two corporations (see ante, Vol. 12 N. S. 347 to 353).
II. PRESCRIPTION.9
0 -
The terms "prescription," and "limitation," and the express-
sions "presumption of a grant," " stale equity," and some others
indicating title or exemption from action, are not always employed
with precision. The term "prescription," from the word prescribo,
is derived from the Roman or civil law, and is more comprehensive
than limitation. Pi escription has often been employed as applica-
ble to easements alone, but it is not necessarily or by general usage
so limited. It is so comprehensive as to be often used to include
limitation as prescribed by the Statute of Limitations, the prescrip-
tion of a grant, the doctrine of stale equity as applied by chancery
courts, and every means by which a title is quieted, or an action
barred by lapse of time. It has been said that prescription in its
proper sense is of two kinds. "That is, it is either an instrument
of the acquisition of property, or an instrument of an exemption
only from the servitude of judicial process."
The statutes of limitation have generally been so drawn as not
to apply to easements, but courts of law and equity on general
principles apply to them the principles of the Statute of Limita-
the school lands. The Ohio legislature authorized a sale without authority of
Congress : 3 Chase Stat. 1552, &c.
sof Angell on Limitations, 2. The Statute of Limitations affects the remedy
merely, while prescription affects the right: Billings v. Hall, 7 Cal. 1.
For a discussion of prescription, see Cruise Dig. tit. xxxi., ch. 1, I I1 ; Angell
on Highways, 131 ; Washburn's Real Property.
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tions by presuming a grant. So in many cases which do not fall
within the statute, and in some that do, courts of law, as we have
seen, apply the d6ctrine of the presumption of a grant.
The statutes of limitation have generally been so drawn as only
to apply to actions at law, and yet when parties seek remedies in
equity the courts, though not bound by any statute, generally act
by way of analogy to it, and apply its principles. They do this
upon the doctrine that they will not aid a 8tale equity.
Statutes of limitation are generally so drawn as to affect only
tlie remedy without touching the right. The presumption of a
gtrant, and prescription when it applies independently of thestatute,
denies the right and so withholds a remedy. The doctrine of stale
equity proceeds upon the idea that all equitable right is gone, and
so denies the right and withholds the remedy.
To preserve the symmetry and distinctive features of the law
the several subjects of "presumption of a grant," "prescription,"
"limitations," "stale equities," and legal and equitable "estop-
pels," might well be treated separately, and regarded as distinct
doctrines, though cogrlate in their character and relations.
Prescription, when applied to realty as distinct-from the doctrine
of the presumption of a grant, is generally employed only at law
and in the second sense mentioned, which might better be defined
a means of denying or defeating a remedy by pleading the Statute
of Limitations.
III. LICENSE. 9
This is a generic term, and will only be considered as to rights
in land for religious purposes. A license is a right given by com-
petent authority to do an act or enjoy a privilege which without
it would be illegal.
The permission to occupy a piece of ground for religious exer-
cise or to erect a church thereon is a license.
A license is either (1) implied or (2) express.
It is either (1) by parol or (2) in writing.
It is either (1) a bare authority without interest or (2) it i -
coupled with an interest.
It is either (1) executory or (2) executed.
It is either (1) revocable or (2) irrevocable.
91 License distinguished from easement: Washb. Easements and Servitudes 6.
23 ; Ex parte ('oburn, I Cow. 568 ; Wolfe v. Frost, 4 Sandf. Ch. 72; Foster Y.
Browder, 4 R. 1. 47 ; Bowbotham v. Wilson, 8 Ellis & B. 23.
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An implied license is one presumed from the conduct of the
party having a right to give it.
An express license is one which in direct terms gives the per-
mission to do an act or enjoy a privilege.
When this permission is given by word merely, it is a parol
license. I
A wiritten license may pursue all the statutory formalities re-
quired for the conveyance of real estate, or it may be without
such formality and yet valid. 92
Whatever may be its form or character, it may be a bare author-
ity without being coupled with an interest. When it is of this
character, it is, until some act is done under it, merely executory,
and being without consideration is revocable.
It can only be executed by the party to whom it is given in
person, and cannot be transferred to another.
But when executed by being carried partly or altogether into
effect, it can only be rescinded when it is of such character that
this is practicable, and then only by a party placing the other in
the same condition he would have occupied before he entered on
its execution.
An executed license where the parties cannot be placed in statu
quo is irrevocable."
When the license is coupled with an interest it is not a mere
permission, but is in effect equivalent to an irrevocable grant which
is alienable.9
A license may arise upon the principle of legal or equitable
estoppel.95
The legal and equitable principles as to license prevailing in
ordinary cases, apply as a general rule equally as to rights in
realty for religious purposes, subject to the restraints, if any, im-
posed by law.
92 Sullivant v. Commissioners, 3 Ohio 89. But see 6 East 602 ; 8 Id. 310 n.
Say R. 3 ; 14 S. & I. 267 ; 4 Id. 241 ; 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 522; 11 Ad. & El. 39
s. c. 39 E. C. L. R. 19.
93 I1ilson v. Chafant, 15 Ohio 248; Burk-inghain v. Smith, 10 Id. 296 ; 1Vil-
lains v. Presb. Ch., I Ohio St. 478; 8 East 308 Palm. 71; s. C. loph. 151
s. c. 2 Roll. R. 152.
91 Crabb Real Prop., . 521-525; 2 Mod. 317 ; 8 East 309 ; 7 Bing. 693; 5
B. & C. 221; 7 D. & R. 783.
95 See note 81 ante; Att.-Gen. v. Mlferrimac Co., 14 Gray 604 ; Buckinyham v.
Synith, 10 Ohio 293.
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Possession taken under an executed license is a good defence in
an action, of ejcetnent,"0 and will enable the occupant to maintain
trespass for an injury, and gives the right to rebuild and repair
churches erected in pursuance of the license.
IV. DEDICATION.
There is a clear distinction between a license and a dedication."
It is not designed to attempt a discussion of the law of dedica-
tion generally, for this in its details would require a treatise rather
than a chapter. But a brief outline of some principles will be
stated.
For all practicable purposes a dedication of 'land is a gift for a
public use.
A dedication may be (1) express or (2) implied. An express
dedication may be by (1) parol or (2) in writing. Dedications may
be as at (1) common law or (2 statutory. A parol dedication, or
one in writing without the statutory formalities required in deeds
of conveyance, will be sustained.9 8
By the Civil Law realty could be devoted to religious purposes
by dedication."
And the common law equally allows it for charitable uses, as
church lots, cemetery grounds and like purposes.",
96 Snilliant v. Commissioners, 3 Ohio 89; Wilson-v. Chalfant, 15 Id. 248.
97 Gowen v. Phila. JAxd1an.qe Co., 5 W. & S. 143. For discussion or, see An-
gell on Highways, ?? 132-168; Dillon on Municipal Corp. 475 ; Cincinnati v.
r1l7te, 6 Pet. 431 ; o 1es v. ai|rd, 19 Conn. 250 ; Aanley v. Gibson, 13 Ills.
312.
9s Fulton v. Wehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440 ; Wtisby v. Donte, 19 Id. 238 ; Angell
on hlighways, . 142-162 ; ]lobb v. Lowell: 19 Pick. 405 ; 1Viqlht v. Takey, 3
C1sh. 290 ; llorris v. Bowers, Wright (Ohio) 750 ; IM7iliaas v. Presb. Church, 1
Ohio St. 478.
99 iqaes v. Dtyae, 7 La. Ann. 449 ; Renthrop v. Bonrg, 4 Martin (La.) 97;
Inst. 1, 2, 7, 9 ; Bract. fol. 8; Abbott v. Mills, 3 Verm. 521 ; 1)oe v. .ones, 11
Ala. 83; Pawleff v. Clark, 9 Cranch 293, 321 • Washburn's Easements and Scr-
vitudes 185 [137]. In Angell on Highways, . 133, it is said " the doctrine of
dedication is of purely common-law origin. * * * In that [Civil] law lhcrc was
no principle strictly analogous to that of dedication." Poth. Pand. de Inst., lib.
43, tit. 8, art. 1.
100 Antones v. Es/a 'a, 9 Port. (Alab.) 527 ; THannibal v. Draper, 15 I[o. 634;
iqu'ies v. Dajac, 7 La. Ann. 449 ; Christian Ch. v. Scholte, 2 Iowa 27 ; Chapman
v. Gordon, 29 Ga. 250; Shapleigh v. Pilburl, I Greenl. (Me.) 280; Dillon on
MAuic. Corp., 510; Ifigh on Injnnctitns, ? 241 ; Washh. Easements 186 [138] ;
Beatty v. Kartz, 2 Peters C. C. R. 566, 583 ; Board Ed. v. Edson, 18 Ohio St.
221 ; Rice Y. O.igood, 9 Mass 38; 3 Peters 99 ; P~earsall v. Post, 20 Wend. 118;
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But this is of course subject to the qualification that where the
local law imposes restraints on grants, these cannot be evaded by
a dedication.
And a dedication may arise upon the principle of estoppel.10'
A dedication may be found as a question of fact by user even
less than the statutory period of limitation, especially if there be
evidence of acquiescence.
4 2
Courts of equity 'ill not permit funds devoted to a particular
charity to be devoted to other objects, even if those for whose use
it was given should concur in a diversion. 103
Potter v. Chapin, 6 Paige 639 ; 3 Washburn on Real Property 70; Att.-Gen. v.
Merrimac Co., 14 Gray 586, 604; lVilliams v. Prasb. Soc., I Ohio St. 478; Todd
v. P. Railroad Co. 19 Id. 514 ; Wisby v. Bont,, Id. 245 ; 1 Law Record, Cin.,
Ohio 166; 2 Myl. & K. 576 n., and cases cited; Taylor rrec. Wills 67 ; Brown v.
Manning, 6 Ohio 298. The doctrine commenced with the case of Lade v. Shepard, 2
Strange 1004, A. 1. 1735. 0
As to cemetery: Hunter v. Sandy Hill, 6 Hill (N. Y.) 407, commented on 2
Smith's Lead. Cas., 4th ed. 193 ; 22 Wend. 454. Other purposes : Reynolds v.
Commrs., 5 Ohio 204; Smith v. Hueston, 6 Id. 101; Id. 298, 305; Klinkener v.
School Dist., 1I Penna. St. 444.
101 3 Washb. Real Prop. 70 ; Dillon Munic. Corp., 495 ; Cinn. v. Tlhite, 6
Peters 431 ; Brown v. Manning, 6 Ohio 298 ; 7 Ohio, part 1, p. 96, 220 ; Id. part
2, p. 135 ; Fulton v. Mehrenfeld, 8 Ohio St. 440 ; Noyes v. Ward, 19 Conn. 250;
Mayor v. Franklin, 12 Ga. 239; Cole v. Sprowl, 35 Me. 161 ; 2 Greenl. Ev.,
1662. In Angell on Highways, 156, it is said this doctrine "is not sanctioned
by a single English decision."
102 Pinquite v. Lawrence, II Ohio St. 274. See cases collected in Angell on
Highways, f 142. In Woodyear v. Hadden, 5 Taunt. 125, it is said, "it i3 not
like a grant presumed from length of time." See Angell, passin. But in Rugby
Charity v. Merryweather, 1 1 East 375, an uninterrupted user of eight years was
deemed sufficient proof of dedication, without reference to the intention of the
owner. A dedication must be for a public use: 19 Ohio St. 514 ; Dillon Munic.
Corp., . 510 n.
103 This is a general principle, without reference to the mode of acquiring pro-
perty: Tiffany & Bullard on -Trusts 250; Miller v. Gfable, 2 l)enio 492, 541 ; s. c.
10 Paige 627; Kinskern Y. Luth. Ch., I Sandf. Ch. 439 ; Meld v. ield, 9 Wend.
394; Robertson v. Bullions, 9 Barb. 132 ; Mlain v. Bullett, I Verm. 43 ; Atl.-Gen.
v. Gleg, I Atk. 356; App v. Luth. Conq. 6 Barr 201. As to dedicatibns in rruit,
see Dillon Manic. Corp., ? 512.
Property conveyed to promote the teaching of particular religious doctrines will
be protected from a diversion : Iann v. allet, 1 Verm. 43; Att.-Gen. v. Gleg,
I Atk. 356 ; App v. Lutheran Cog , 6 Barr 201 ; Miller v. Gable, 2 l)cnio 492 ;
Gable v. Miller, 10 Paige 201 ; At.-Gen. v. Shore, 7 Sim. 290 ; Shore v. Wilson,
9 Cl. & Fir 355 ; Att.-Gen. v. Pearson,.1l Sim. 592 ; Brown v. Luth Ch., 23
Penna. St. 493; Field v. Field, 9 Wend. 394; Trustees v. Sturgeon, 9 Barr 322;
Hill on Trustees, 3d ed. 467, note 1, and cases cited. Feizel v. Trustees, 9 Kansas
592. The bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church assigned a minister to a
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Where a dedication is made for a specified use, the courts will
prevent its diversion. 104 Even the legislature cannot authorize a
diversion wher private rights are involved. '5
Nor can evidence of the declarations of a dedicator be given to
vary the purposes expressed in a written dedication. 105
A dedication will be sustained, even though there be no grantee
in esse when it was made capable of taking a fee. '7
Ir. ALIENATION.
The subject of alienation by churches is not now to be consid-
ered. This will be reserved for a subsequent chapter. The
acquisition of property by church organizations by alienation from
church held by trustees by deed in usual form of discipline. The trustees refused
to permit the use of the church. The court issued a mandamus to compel them.
The case was ably argued by Hon. S. A. Cobb and H. L. Alden, who cited 4 IL &
MolI. (Md.) 449 ; 2 Barb. 397 ; 12 Johns. 444. The court as a question of plead-
ing refused to allow damages, but said "the legal pastor can recover salary due
him in an ordinary action at law."
If a gift be made to a Unitarian society for the propagation of Unitarian doc-
trines, and the society ceases to teach Unitarianism, it will not be entitled to con-
trol the trust : Gilman v. Hamilton, 16 Ills. 225. See cases of Andrew v. N. Y.
Bible 4 P. B3. Soc., 4 Sandf. S. C. It. 178, commented on in Tiffany & Bullard
on Trusts 248 ; Willard's Eq. 577, 596 ; AlMiller v. Gable, 2 Denio 524 ; Williams
v. Iilliams, 4 Selden (N. Y.) 525.
"The doctrine of charities in the United States is substantially the same as in
England in all that class of cases where they can be administered by the court
without the aid of the crown ; and in that class of cases where the sign manual
of the king is necessary, the gift would fail, and a trust would result to the heir at
law or next of kin, unless the legislature interfere to give it effect:"1 Willard's
Eq. 579 ; Vidal v. Girard Ex., 2 Htow. 127 ; Ingles v. Trustees Sailors' Snug
Htarbor, 3 Pet. 99 ; Exrs. of Burr v. Smith, 7 Verm. 241 ; Graiq v. Emery, 16
Pick- 107 ; McCarty v. Orphans' Asylum, 9 Cow. 437 ; Tiffany & Bullard on
Trusts 249 ; Willard's Eq. 596 ; 4 Kent Com. 508.
104 See cases in note to sect. 512, Dillon Munic. Corp. ; A. E. Church v. Ho.
boken, 33 N.J. Law 13.
105 Le Clercq v. Gallltolis, 7 Ohio, part 1, p. 217; 18 Id. 24 ; 11arren v. Lyons
City, 22 Iowa 351 ; John and Cherry St., 19 Wend. 659 ; Woodruffv. l'eal, 28
Conn. 168 ; Dillon Munic. Corp., 514 ; Commrs. v. Lathrop, S. Ct. Kansas 1872.
But where the donor or grantor retains no beneficial interest the legislature may
authorize a sale: Van ess v. WVashington, 4 Pet. 232 ; Com. v. Bush, 14 Penna.
St. 16 ; Com. v. Alburger, I Whart. 469 ; Board v. Edson, 18 Ohio St. 221.
106 .Lrown v. M4anning, 6 Ohio 298; Lebanon v. Conmrs., 9 Id. 80.
107 P1awltt v.Clark, 9 Cranch 292; New Orleans v. U. S., 10 Pet. 713 ; Wil-
liams v. Pre.b. Soc., 1 Ohio St. 478; AcConnell v. Lexington, 12 Wheat. 582;.
Ime v. Jones, I1 Ala. 63 ; Vick v. Vickshurjq, I Ilow. (Miss.) 379 ; Antones v.
Eslata, 9 Port. (Ala.) 527 ; Winona v. Huff, 11 Minn. 119 ; Savannah v. Steam-
b,,,, Co., Chart. (Ga.) R. "342 ; Klinkene' v. School District, I Jones (Penna.)
Von,. XXII.-6
